I think you and I can disagree on this issue.

The aluminum tubes … all the machinery needed to process raw ore … the technology to move from yellowcake into something resembling fissionable material.

Lord Butler left the door open for several interpretations.

Never at any point does he says, We have confirmed intelligence that Saddam recieved fissionable material from Africa.

What is Lord Butler saying?

“Our reasons were good enough for me personally.”

Exactly what happens if Lord Butler says, “It was all a lie?”

Being a Lord of England, could he say that IF he found it to be true knowing the consequences included the fall of his government?

And, paragraph 503 pretty much rips the curtain away.

It contains the continueing assumption that since 75% of Nigers exports are uranium, Iraq was trying to get uranium.

The Lord ignores Niger’s discovery of oil during the same period.

From the bloody wikipedia… how low can I go?

Niger has oil potential. In 1992, the Djado permit was awarded to Hunt Oil, and in 2003 the Tenere permit was awarded to the China National Petroleum Company. An ExxonMobil-Petronas joint venture now holds the sole rights to the Agadem block, north of Lake Chad, and oil exploration is ongoing.

Might it be that oil and the UN Oil for Food program was on the agenda?

Niger is the poorest country in the world.

Not a highly likely scenario for Saddam. But, Saddam never was predictable to the US intelligence services, eh?

The US intelligence “community” never saw the Kuwait invasion coming.

The US intelligence “community” never thought Saddam was so afraid of the US post Desert Storm that they obeyed the orders to destroy WMD….

Wrong, wrong, and now…. 100% percent right??

Actually, wrong three times in a row.

unconfirmed

and then:

We have been told that it was not until early 2003 that the British Government became
aware that the US (and other states) had received from a journalistic source a number of
documents alleged to cover the Iraqi procurement of uranium from Niger. Those
documents were passed to the IAEA, which in its update report to the United Nations
Security Council in March 2003 determined that the papers were forgeries:

Journalistic sources provided forgeries to the USA and other states…..

“We also note that, because the intelligence evidence was inconclusive, neither the
Government’s dossier nor the Prime Minister went on to say that a deal between the
Governments of Iraq and Niger for the supply of uranium had been signed, or uranium
shipped.”

The intelligence evidence was inconclusive….

In early 1999, Iraqi officials visited a number of African countries, including Niger. The
visit2 was detected by intelligence, and some details were subsequently confirmed by
Iraq. The purpose of the visit was not immediately known. But uranium ore accounts for
almost three-quarters of Niger’s exports. Putting this together with past Iraqi purchases
of uranium ore from Niger, the limitations faced by the Iraq regime on access to indigenous uranium ore and other evidence of Iraq seeking to restart its nuclear programme, the JIC judged that Iraqi purchase of uranium ore could have been the subject of discussions and noted in an assessment in December 2000 that:

. . . unconfirmed intelligence indicates Iraqi interest in acquiring uranium.

Lord Butler fudged his bets better than a New York stock broker on ebay.

But, the IAEA did not.

“The investigation was centred on documents provided by a number of States that
pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium to Iraq
between 1999 and 2001. The IAEA has discussed these reports with the
Governments of Iraq and Niger, both of which have denied that any such activity took
place. For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of
its relations with Niger, and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of
African countries, including Niger, in February 1999,which Iraq thought might have
given rise to the reports. The IAEA was able to review correspondence coming from
various bodies of the Government of Niger, and to compare the form, format,
contents and signatures of that correspondence with those of the alleged
procurement-related documentation. Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has
concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents, which
formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and
Niger, are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specifc
allegations are unfounded.

[IAEA GOV/INF/2003/10 Annex of 7 March 2003]

A quote also included in the Butler report.

Just a side note, how come we know who traveled where and when in detail, but we believe massive amounts of WMD escaped undetected from Iraq?

MD

It’s all about context:

BUTLER REPORT

(Page 123, Paragraph 499)

We conclude that…the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the Government’s dossier, and by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, were well-founded. By extension we conclude also that the statement in President Bush’s State of the Union Address of 28 January 2003 that: “The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa” was well-founded.

Is that a good thing?

MD

The Iraqi response referred to above explained that,on 8 February 1999, Mr. Wissam
Al Zahawie,Iraq’s then Ambassador to the Holy See,as part of a trip to four African
countries,visited Niger as an envoy of the then President of Iraq to Mr. Ibrahim Bare,
the then President of Niger,in order to deliver an of•cial invitation for a visit to Iraq,
planned for 20 to 30 April 1999. (N.B. Mr. Bare passed away on 9 April 1999.)
According to the Iraqi information,no such presidential visit from Niger to Iraq took
place before 2003.
The Iraqi authorities provided the IAEA with excerpts from Mr. Al Zahawie’s travel
report to Niger. These excerpts support the above explanation by the Ambassador
regarding the purpose of his visit to Niger and do not contain any references to
discussions about uranium supply from Niger.
In order to further clarify the matter,the IAEA interviewed Mr. Al Zahawie on 12
February 2003. The information provided by the Ambassador about details about
his 1999 trip to Africa also supported the information obtained previously by the
Agency on this visit.

The demeanour of the Ambassador and the general tone of the
interview did not suggest that he was under particular pressure to hide or fabricate
information.

At best, we had some very strong arguments for and against.

MD

The man lied.

He knew the 17 words used in the State of the Union were false.

Tenet and the CIA told him.

And, I don’t give a hoot about the conclusions of factcheck.org.

I check facts for a living.

No uranium being sold by Niger to Iraq. No nuclear program in Iraq.

MD